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The group density effect, where a group member’s psychiatric risk is associated with the proportion of 
the local population their group comprises, demonstrates the importance of minority group status to 
mental health. Previous research, focusing on ethnicity, has been correlational, but newly-formed 
identities provide opportunities for natural experiments, with greater scope for causal inference. This 
study examines whether such a group density effect can be found for the novel Brexit identities of ‘leaver’ 
and ‘remainer’ following the UK’s divisive 2016 referendum on EU membership. 
Mixed effects models were fitted to the Understanding Society panel survey series (N=25,555, 19,767 for 
analyses controlling for pre-referendum mental health data), predicting mental health as a function of 
individual opinion on EU membership and local referendum results. These interacted such that those 
holding the local majority opinion had better mental health (Odds ratio (OR):.875 [.766-.9995]), 
compared to those in the minority. This result survived adjustment for individual and area-level 
economic circumstances (OR:.866 [.758-.989]), and, strikingly, pre-referendum mental health (OR: .841 
[.709-.998]), as well as a number of other potential confounding variables. 
The results provide evidence for rapidly forming group density effects  based on de novo identities, and 
suggest that identity may be a causal mechanism for group density effects more broadly. They also speak 
to the extent of polarisation in the Brexit-era UK, and its public health consequences. 
Keywords: UK; Brexit; ethnic density; social identity theory; inter-group relations; group density;  social 
epidemiology; public mental health 
  
• Previous group density studies correlational and unable to establish causation 
• Novel identities from UK’s EU referendum allow study of formation of this effect. 
• Density effect evident post-referendum but not beforehand. 




Being in a minority can be an uncomfortable experience. One striking demonstration of the psychological 
consequences of minority status is the group density effect, where the mental health of a member of a 
minority group is positively correlated with the proportion of the local population belonging to the same 
group (Shaw et al., 2012). The majority of group density studies have focused on ethnic minorities, but 
this phenomenon has also been found for sexual minorities (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2011) and social classes 
(Schofield et al., 2016). Proposed mechanisms (Bécares et al., 2009) echo some of those identified in the 
broader literature on minority health inequalities: experience of discrimination and stigmatisation 
(Meyer, 1995; Clark et al., 1999), status anxiety (Layte and Whelan, 2014), and access to culturally-
specific sources of social capital (Whitley and Prince, 2005).  
 
Group density designs, however, fall well short of the criteria of causal inference (Hernán and Robins, 
2020). They implicitly assume that that people from the same group living at different levels of group 
density are otherwise equivalent, differing only in the degree of minority status they experience. Such an 
assumption is questionable and it is possible that some or all of this phenomenon is compositional rather 
than contextual, reflecting the self-selecting nature of where people live. The human and economic 
geography of where minority and majority groups live, why individual members of groups may not live in 
their group’s enclaves (gentrification, social mobility etc.), and other concerns are products of the long 
histories of these group identities. This is also major part of the problem with causal inference in this field 
because there is no ‘time zero’ before which the group density effect did not apply. Thus time cannot be 
used as a contrast to help isolate causation. 
 
However, as shown by the pioneering work of Tajfel and Turner (1979), identity can be dynamic and 
even arbitrary characteristics can be adopted as features of one’s identity if these characteristics can be 
made salient. A possible approach to improve internal validity would be to take advantage of a newly 
salient social identity and use it as the basis for a group density study. Then analyses can account for 
participants’ mental health prior to the identity becoming salient to test whether any group density effect 
coincides with the newly salient identities. 
 
One such example is the identities of ‘leaver’ and ‘remainer’ in the  Brexit-era United Kingdom (UK). On 
the 23rd of June 2016, the UK voted 52 to 48% in a referendum to leave the European Union (EU). The 
UK’s membership of the EU had previously been a fairly low salience issue – YouGov’s tracking poll asking 
respondents to identity the three most important issues facing the country found that 19% picked 
‘Europe’ in the first poll of 2015 (YouGov Ltd, 2015) – but, following the referendum, came to dominate 
British politics – 62% picked ‘Britain leaving the EU’ in the first such poll of 2017 (YouGov Ltd, 2017). But 
Brexit is not just a conventional political squabble, it has led to strong affective polarisation between the 
de novo social identities of remainer and leaver. These identities have become at least as strong than 
traditional party affiliations, according to survey (Hobolt et al., n.d.) and behavioural economic (Murray et 
al., 2017) evidence, and, strikingly, only a minority of respondents say they would be happy if their child 
married someone with the opposing view (Hobolt et al., n.d.). 
 
These Brexit identities have a strong geographical quality. Changes in economic geography have created 
place-based political and cultural divides, with urban centres diverging politically and culturally from 
towns and rural areas (Jennings and Stoker, 2019). The geographical aspect to the Brexit vote is not a 
purely academic observation, but has become is central to how the identities of remainers and leavers, 
living in ‘Remainia’ and ‘Brexitland’ respectively, have been framed and constructed (Sykes, 2018).  
 
Research supports the idea that Brexit has been a sufficiently emotive event to impact people’s mental 
health. Powdthavee et al. (2019) found that poor mental health was both a likely driver of the Brexit vote 
and a consequence of it. Vandoros et al. (2019) used a difference-in-differences analysis of anti-
depressant prescriptions relative to iron and anti-gout medication, finding that there was a relative 
increase in anti-depressant prescriptions compared to the control medications. Kavetsos et al,( 2018) 
used a difference-in-differences between respondents to the Eurobarometer survey series in the UK and 
those in other EU countries, finding a relative decline in mental health among UK respondents with a 
positive or neutral opinion of the EU. Frost (2020) found an increase in UK-based migrants’ anxiety, 
which was larger in more leave-voting areas. Finally, Katshu (2019), reports a case of an acute psychotic 
episode that appeared to be induced by the referendum. 
 
Given this strong and geographically-loaded group polarisation, combined with evidence of a measurable 
impact of Brexit on mental health from other studies, it seems plausible that those holding a view that is 
in the minority locally may be vulnerable to some of the consequences of mental ill health demonstrated 
by other kinds of minorities in the literature. The fact that these identities either did not exist at all prior 
to the referendum, or at least were much less salient, allows us to carry out a natural experiment of group 
salience, a novel approach in group density effect research.   
 
Data and methods 
The authors assert that all procedures contributing to this work comply with the ethical standards of the 
relevant national and institutional committees on human experimentation and with the Helsinki 
Declaration of 1975, as revised in 2008. The University of Essex Ethics Committee has approved all data 
collection on Understanding Society main study and innovation panel waves, including asking consent for 
all data linkages except to health records.  Requesting consent for health record linkage was approved at 
Wave 1 by the National Research Ethics Service (NRES) Oxfordshire REC A (08/H0604/124), at BHPS 
Wave 18 by the NRES Royal Free Hospital & Medical School (08/H0720/60) and at Wave 4 by NRES 
Southampton REC A (11/SC/0274). The analyses reported here were approved by Bangor University 
School of Psychology Ethics Committee (Ref: 2019-16690).  
 
Data were used from Understanding Society (University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic 
Research et al., 2019), a household panel survey with participants across the UK. Special licence data with 
respondents’ UK parliamentary constituency of residence were accessed, following permission from the 
data owners, via the UK Data Archive (http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6614-13). The main analyses 
used Wave 8 (2016-2018), supplemented with mental health data from waves 4-7 as detailed below. The 
control analyses of pre-referendum data used the pre-referendum portion of Wave 7 (2015-2017). 
  
The following variables were used from Understanding Society (with variable names in the data file) 
given in parentheses): the 12-item General Health Questionnaire (GHQ, Goldberg and Blackwell, 1970), a 
screening instrument for mental health, specifically the ‘caseness’ summed score (h_scghq2_dv), 
dichotomised so scores of 0-2 indicated better mental health and scores of 3-12 indicated  poorer mental 
health (the most widely used dichotomisation threshold Goldberg et al., 1997); opinion on the UK’s 
membership of the EU, measured with the question ‘Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the 
European Union or leave the European Union’ (h_eumem); sex (h_sex); age (h_age_dv); the month 
(h_intdatm_dv) and year (h_intdaty_dv) of interview; total net weekly personal income (h_fimnnet_dv); the 
two digit Cross-National Equivalent Files classification which industry respondents’ current job comes 
under (h_jbiindb_dv); household ID (h_hidp); parliamentary constituency (h_pcon); individual sampling 
weights (h_indinus_lw); ethnicity (ethn_dv), dichotomised into white 
British/English/Scottish/Welsh/Northern Irish and all other ethnicities, to avoid issues of 
multicollinearity; whether or not respondents were born in the UK or not (bornuk_dv);  and finally the 
most recent pre-referendum dichotomised GHQ score (e_scghq2_dv, f_scghq2_dv, or g_scghq2_dv), if one 
was available in 2014-2016. 
 
Equivalent data were used from Wave 7 for the pre-referendum control analysis, but linked to Wave 8 
data for opinion on EU membership, as this question was not asked in Wave 7. 
 
These data were linked to two geographical datasets: estimated constituency-level results from the EU 
referendum and area-level poverty. Official Welsh, English, and Scottish results were reported at the local 
authority level, while Northern Irish results were reported at constituency level. Given that the 
populations of local authorities vary by orders of magnitude while constituencies are roughly equivalent 
in size, Hanretty’s widely used (Hanretty, 2017) estimates of constituency-level referendum results were 
used. Area-level poverty was operationalised as the proportion of working age adults in receipt of 
benefits (social security) in each constituency, downloaded from the Office for National Statistics’ Nomis 
website (Claimant count series, monthly data averaged for 2016-18, https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/). 
  
Wave 8 included 39,289 respondents, but respondents were excluded if they a) did not express a ‘leave’ 
or ‘remain’ opinion on the EU (N= 5017), b) were interviewed prior to the referendum (N=8568), c) were 
missing GHQ data (N=135), or d) were missing constituency data (N=14). This left 25,555 respondents 
across 15,425 households in all 650 constituencies. The analyses including pre-referendum scores as a 
covariate (Models 3-7, plus supplementary models, see below) had 19,767 respondents across 12,799 
households. 
 
Seven binomial generalised linear mixed effects models were fitted to assess whether the association 
between mental distress and opinion on the UK’s membership of the EU was moderated by the estimated 
result of the referendum in their constituency. In all models, being over the threshold on the GHQ (i.e. a 
GHQ score greater than 2) was the dependent variable. Opinion on EU membership, estimated proportion 
of leave voters in the respondent’s constituency (z-scored), sex, and linear and relevant constituency’ 
quadratic terms for age were the fixed effects. Nested random intercepts of households within 
constituencies were also included. Residuals were weighted by individual sampling weights.  
 
The second model was as the basic model, outlined above, but also included income and proportion of the 
working age population claiming benefits, both z-scored.. Controlling for individual and area-level 
individual and ecological material circumstances is standard in group density studies, as economic 
disparities often exist between majority and minority groups. 
 
The third model, fitted to the subset of the data where pre-referendum GHQ data were available, included 
pre-referendum dichotomised GHQ scores as a covariate. This was to test whether the putative ethnic 
density pattern developed since the referendum or whether it pre-exists it. 
 
The fourth model was as the third but added the industry classification of the respondent’s job as a 
covariate. Potentially some remainers living in leave-voting areas felt differently to their neighbours 
primarily because of the perceived threat to their livelihoods, and this explains their poorer mental health 
post-referendum. 
 
The fifth was as the third but included a dichotomised measure of ethnicity plus its interaction with local 
leave vote. The sixth was as the third but included whether the respondent had been born in the UK, plus 
its interaction with local leave vote. These were to rule out any Brexit density effect being a ‘standard’ 
ethnic density effect in disguise – remainers who were migrants or members of ethnic minorities may 
have experienced a detriment to their mental health following the referendum due to feeling more 
stigmatised or less wanted by their local communities and the effect could represent an activation of 
these existing identities rather than the new Brexit identities. 
 
The seventh was as the third but including a main effect of education. Education was a key correlate of 
Brexit voting, with those with higher levels of education favouring remain and those with lower levels 
favouring leave (Ford and Goodwin, 2017), but obviously represents a pre-existing set of cultural 
identities. Thus finding the hypothesised density effect after controlling for education is a particularly 
exacting test of the hypothesis. 
 
Control analyses 
A control analysis was run on the pre-referendum portion of Wave 7, for the 23,105 respondents who 
could be linked to a Wave 8 opinion on leaving the EU. The model fitted had the same structure as Model 
2 above. Although the above models that include pre-referendum mental health implicitly test whether 
any such Brexit density effect can be explained by pre-referendum patterns in mental health, explicitly 
fitting a model to pre-referendum data gives a tangible sense of whether any such pattern represents a 
meaningful change relative to before the referendum. 
 
Although the GHQ cut off used is standard in the literature, and avoids making assumptions of interval 
data that are unlikely to hold for Likert data, such cut offs are still somewhat arbitrary. A second version 
of Model 3 was thus run on continuous GHQ scores to ensure that the 3+ cut off is not unrepresentative of 
the raw data. 
 
Geographical heterogeneity of effect 
Three analyses were run to check for geographical heterogeneity in the effect. One included a term for 
Government Offices for the Regions (GOR, a system of dividing the UK into the three non-English nations 
and a set of English regions) and its interactions with area-level leave vote, individual opinion, plus the 
three-way interaction. A second included the main effect and interaction terms for whether the 
respondent lived in an urban or rural area (h_urban_dv), a third included modelled estimates of the 
impact of a ‘no deal’ Brexit on employment of the residents of each British constituency (excluding 
Northern Ireland) to a ‘no deal’ Brexit (Winters and Serwicka, 2018), plus the associated interactions 
with area-level leave vote, individual opinion, and the three way interaction. 
 
Statistical significance was assessed by overlap of the 95% confidence intervals of the odds ratio (OR) of 
each term in the model with 1. 
 
Models were fitted in R (R Core Team, 2019) using the glmmTMB package (Brooks et al., 2017). 
Multicollinearity was assessed using variance inflation factors, computed using the check_collinearity 
function from the performance package (Lüdecke et al., 2019). Figures were made with the ggplot2 
package (Wickham, 2016). 
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 1. The sample was slightly more remain-supporting (58%) than 
leave-supporting, even after reweighting (54%), and, on average, leavers were older, more male, and 
reported lower incomes. Note that the sample included respondents aged 16+ while the referendum had 
an 18+ franchise, so it is not clear what leave/remain split would be representative of the population. 
 
Table 2 shows the results from the seven mixed effects models. Respondents who wanted to leave the EU 
reported greater distress, but the main effect of constituency leave vote was not statistically significant. 
However, as hypothesised, the interaction of these factors was significant, such that living in a more 
leave-voting area was relatively protective for leavers but a risk factor for distress in remainers. Figure 1 
shows this interaction in the post-referendum data and the equivalent plot for the pre-referendum data, 
where the group density effect is not evident. 
 
 
Figure 1. Linear terms for proportion reporting poor mental health (GHQ score 3+) as a function of their 
opinion on EU membership and the referendum result in their constituency of residence in pre and post-
referendum data. 
 
Otherwise, older age (linear term), higher income, and being male were all associated with lower risk of 
distress and living in a more deprived area, as indicated by benefit claimant rates, was a risk factor for 
distress, as was having a GHQ score over 2 pre-referendum. No industries reached statistical significance 
in Model 4. All variance inflation factors were 2.01 or less, indicating no evidence of multicollinearity, 
with the exception of Model 5 where the main effect of area-level leave voting and its interaction with 
ethnicity had variance inflation factors approaching 6, indicating moderate multicollinearity. Most of the 
variance captured on the random effects level was on the household (SD=2.008), rather than the 
constituency (SD=.00009) level (Model 3, similar figures across models). 
 


























Leavers 10732 5640.384 0.232 
52.53 
[17.93] 0.522 -16666.67 661.264 1100 1480.552 2035.122 65857.062 
Remainers 14823 6672.247 0.228 
45.46 
[18.24] 0.574 -3333.33 570.83 1148.33 1603.76 2306.964 89373.68 








OR 97.5% OR 
OR 
2.5% 
OR 97.5% OR 
OR 
2.5% 




Leave the EU (individual) 1.2187 1.0708 1.3870 1.1854 1.0415 1.3492 1.1918 1.0101 1.4063 1.1776 1.0096 1.3737 
Constituency leave vote (z-scored, SD=0.1127403) 1.0556 0.9674 1.1519 1.0344 0.9482 1.1284 1.0617 0.9480 1.1890 1.0935 0.9854 1.2134 
Income (z-scored, SD=1948.259)   0.7667 0.6953 0.8456 0.8351 0.7449 0.9363 0.9438 0.8597 1.0360 
Age (z-scored, SD= 18.44425, linear term) 0.8111 0.7625 0.8627 0.8428 0.7919 0.8970 0.9267 0.8523 1.0076 0.7902 0.7257 0.8604 
Age (z-scored, Quadratic term) 0.9852 0.9346 1.0386 0.9483 0.8980 1.0013 0.9426 0.8762 1.0141 0.8578 0.7985 0.9217 
Male 0.5797 0.5174 0.6494 0.6256 0.5571 0.7026 0.6663 0.5745 0.7729 0.7667 0.6646 0.8846 
Area-level poverty (z-scored, SD=1.0399)   1.1231 1.0499 1.2014 1.1158 1.0238 1.2160 1.0776 0.9948 1.1674 
Pre-referendum GHQ score >2           
19.361
4 14.4891 25.8722 
17.188
7 13.4520 21.9633 
Leave the EU * Constituency leave vote 0.8750 0.7660 0.9995 0.8658 0.7583 0.9887 0.8412 0.7093 0.9978 0.8314 0.7102 0.9732 




OR 97.5% OR 
OR 
2.5% 




      
Leave the EU (individual) 1.2025 1.0314 1.4019 1.1922 1.0230 1.3894 1.1500 0.9832 1.3451       
Constituency leave vote (z-scored, SD=0.1127403) 1.0889 0.8963 1.3228 1.0939 0.9809 1.2199 1.0775 0.9709 1.1958       
Income (z-scored, SD=1948.259) 0.8263 0.7417 0.9206 0.8250 0.7403 0.9193 0.8438 0.7562 0.9416       
Age (z-scored, SD= 18.44425, linear term) 0.9286 0.8598 1.0029 0.9266 0.8583 1.0003 0.8905 0.8192 0.9680       
Age (z-scored, Quadratic term) 0.9471 0.8861 1.0123 0.9433 0.8823 1.0086 0.9399 0.8774 1.0069       
Male 0.6815 0.5943 0.7815 0.6830 0.5954 0.7833 0.6865 0.5981 0.7879       
Area-level poverty (z-scored, SD=1.0399) 1.0975 1.0127 1.1893 1.0979 1.0134 1.1894 1.0867 1.0025 1.1779       
Pre-referendum GHQ score >2 
18.259
4 14.2663 23.3701 
18.373
2 14.3342 23.5503 
18.485
0 14.3858 23.7523       
Leave the EU * Constituency leave vote 0.8223 0.7019 0.9634 0.8150 0.6962 0.9541 0.8239 0.7041 0.9642       
Ethnicity (White British/English/Scottish/Welsh/Northern Irish) 0.9982 0.7911 1.2594                   
Ethnicity (White British/English/Scottish/Welsh/Northern Irish) * 
Constituency leave vote 0.9857 0.7986 1.2167                   
Not born in UK       0.6413 1.0544 0.8223             
Not born in UK * Constituency leave vote   0.6812 1.0937 0.8631             
Education: Other higher degree         1.0845 0.8517 1.3808       
Education: A-level etc           1.0308 0.8311 1.2785       
Education: GCSE etc           1.1919 0.9543 1.4887       
Education: Other qualification           1.1895 0.8974 1.5767       
Education: No qualification           1.4187 1.0653 1.8893       
 Table 2. Odds ratios for all fixed effects in each model. Standard deviations given for all z-scored variables. Terms for different industries not presented for Model 4 
for reasons of space and readability, but none were statistically significant. Note also that models 3-7 fitted to fewer (N=19,767) participants. 
Model 1 code:  glmmTMB(GHQ_Case ~ h_eumem * scale(LeaveVote) + poly(scale(h_age_dv), 2, raw = T) + h_sex + (1| h_pcon/h_hidp), data = US,  weights = h_indinus_lw, 
family = 'binomial') 
Model 2 code:  glmmTMB(GHQ_Case ~ h_eumem * scale(LeaveVote) + scale(Income) + poly(scale(h_age_dv), 2, raw = T) + h_sex + scale(ClaimantCount1618) + (1| 
h_pcon/h_hidp), data = US, weights = h_indinus_lw, family = 'binomial') 
Model 3 code:  glmmTMB(GHQ_Case ~ h_eumem * scale(LeaveVote) + scale(Income) + GHQprereferendum + poly(scale(h_age_dv), 2, raw = T) + h_sex + 
scale(ClaimantCount1618) + (1| h_pcon/h_hidp), data = US_prerefGHQ, weights = h_indinus_lw, family = 'binomial') 
Model 4 code:  glmmTMB(GHQ_Case ~ h_eumem * scale(LeaveVote) + scale(Income) + GHQprereferendum + h_jbiindb_dv + poly(scale(h_age_dv), 2, raw = T) + h_sex + 
scale(ClaimantCount1618) + (1| h_pcon/h_hidp), data = US, weights = h_indinus_lw, family = 'binomial') 
Model 5 code:  glmmTMB(GHQ_Case ~ h_eumem * scale(LeaveVote) + EthnicityDichotomised + EthnicityDichotomised:scale(LeaveVote)+ scale(Income) + 
GHQprereferendum + poly(scale(h_age_dv), 2, raw = T) + h_sex + scale(ClaimantCount1618) + (1| h_pcon/h_hidp), data = US_prerefGHQ, weights = h_indinus_lw, 
family = 'binomial') 
Model 6 code:  glmmTMB(GHQ_Case ~ h_eumem * scale(LeaveVote) + bornuk_dv + bornuk_dv:scale(LeaveVote)+ scale(Income) + GHQprereferendum + 
poly(scale(h_age_dv), 2, raw = T) + h_sex + scale(ClaimantCount1618) + (1| h_pcon/h_hidp), data = US_prerefGHQ, weights = h_indinus_lw, family = 'binomial') 
Model 7 code:  glmmTMB(GHQ_Case ~ h_eumem * scale(LeaveVote) * h_hiqual_dv + scale(Income) + GHQprereferendum + poly(scale(h_age_dv), 2, raw = T) + h_sex + 




The control analysis  of pre-referendum data did not show the same pattern as post-referendum, Indeed 
the interaction non-significantly trended in the opposite direction, with both groups’ mental health 
worsening with increasing own-group density (see Figure 1). A table of coefficients for this model can be 
found in the supplementary materials. 
 
Geographical heterogeneity of effect 
The analyses by different GORs had extremely high levels of multi-collinearity (VIFs as high as 
1753368.30!) so results cannot be interpreted. Although a formal analysis is not presented, a figure of the 
interaction broken down by region is included in the supplementary materials. As the sample size is split 
(unevenly) sixteen ways, these are rather noisier than the main analysis, but the pattern appears 
reasonably consistent across most of the nations and regions. A key exception is Northern Ireland, where 
Brexit seems, understandably, not to have supplanted existing historical social divides. Most GOR areas 
show the pattern from the full dataset however. 
 
 The models looking at moderation by rurality  and by estimated economic vulnerability to a ‘no deal’ 
Brexit found no such moderations and the other terms in the model were similar to those in Model 3 (the 
density effect remained statistically significant in both cases). Tables of the coefficients for these models 
can be found in the supplementary materials. 
 
Discussion 
Analyses of large-scale geographically-linked panel survey data on over 25,000 respondents show that 
the association between opinion on the UK’s EU membership and mental health is moderated by local 
political sentiment, such that being in a local political minority is a risk factor for poor mental health. This 
relationship was not explained by differences between remainers and leavers in age, gender, income, 
industry worked in, or by neighbourhood poverty. The pattern is also not explained by ethnic group or 
whether respondents were born in the UK, or the interactions of these characteristics with local leave 
vote. Most strikingly, after controlling for pre-referendum mental health in a subset (77%) of the data, the 
interaction remained statistically significant. This pattern was not seen in pre-referendum data, 
appearing to have developed since the referendum.  
 
In political terms, this is strong evidence of the degree of polarisation in the UK in the aftermath of the EU 
referendum. Where previous survey evidence (Hobolt et al., n.d.) used explicit questions about 
respondents’ opinion of leavers and remainers, or asked specifically about mental health consequences of 
the referendum as a result of discrimination (Frost, 2020) the present study uses differential associations 
across geography on a question about mental health not obviously related to Brexit. Doing so, it appears 
that the level of division is sufficient to lead to consequences for public mental health on both sides of the 
issue. Replications of this phenomenon in other countries where similar processes of political 
polarisation and realignment are underway (McCoy and Somer, 2019), would be interesting. 
 
In terms of what this tells us about group density effects, this finding is a striking example of a group 
density effect associated with a rapidly formed political identity, rather than a more static identity like 
ethnicity (Simpson et al., 2016). This, combined with the use of pre-referendum data allows greater 
confidence that the mechanism behind this effect was indeed these newly formed political identities, 
rather than the intersection of longer term trends in UK social geography outlined above (Jennings and 
Stoker, 2019) with current cultural conflicts in the UK (Ford and Goodwin, 2017). Such a finding is novel 
in the group–density-effect literature and consistent with predictions from social identity theory (Tajfel 
and Turner, 1979).  
 
Furthermore, Brexit is a case where the power relations between the two groups are somewhat 
ambiguous. While leavers hold political and electoral power, as confirmed by the 2019 UK General 
Election that followed, the descriptive statistics show that remainers were on average more personally 
affluent (although on the area level there was a u-shaped relationship between benefit claimant rates and 
leave voting). Much of the ethnic density literature examines groups clearly in the minority, and 
theoretical accounts of minority mental health, such as the minority stress model (Meyer, 1995) or post-
colonial approaches (Bécares et al., 2013), identify this unambiguous power gradient as a key component 
of the proposed mechanism. These findings emphasise the importance of the local circumstances, rather 
than broader power structures, although the relative importance of an unambiguous power gradient may 
depend on the specific situation.  
 
A few limitations and caveats of the study should be acknowledged. Firstly, it is possible that the 
socioeconomic correlates of one’s opinion on EU membership varied geographically, such that the 
differing mental health of remainers in remain and leave-voting areas represented a compositional, 
rather than contextual, effect. This was the motivation behind controlling for respondents’ industry of 
employment – perhaps remainers in leave-voting areas were disproportionately likely to work in 
industries where they perceived Brexit as especially threatening (financial services or supply chain 
manufacturing for example) and job insecurity explained the elevated distress post-referendum. 
Although this was controlled for, it is not possible to rule out other compositional differences between 
remainers in remain and in leave voting areas (or likewise for leavers), or that the data on industry were 
insufficiently fine-grained to control for this issue. Secondly, the analyses were based on self-report 
measures, rather than diagnostic, behavioural, or medication-based measures. Although Understanding 
Society does ask about clinical diagnoses of depression, only a small number of respondents reported a 
diagnosis (218 of the eventual sample used), far too few to detect the interaction of interest. Furthermore, 
the GHQ is designed to capture recent declines in mood in a way that would be responsive to events like 
Brexit, whereas a diagnosis or medication would likely only be given following a certain duration of poor 
mental health, so would not be sensitive in the situation studied. The GHQ is also designed to capture 
minor psychiatric issues on the population level, so seemed like a good measure given the effect size one 
might plausibly expect (although see Katshu, 2019 for an example of a more dramatic mental health 
reaction to Brexit). Thirdly, although the rapid formation of Brexit identities and control for pre-
referendum mental health, allow us to be more confident about mechanisms than previous group density 
studies, it is possible that individual opinions on the EU or area-level leave vote were proxies for the true 
causal mechanism. Although the identities of remainer and leaver were novel and newly salient, they 
come from pre-existing cultural cleavages in the UK (Ford and Goodwin, 2017). That said, that the group 
density effect survived adjusting for pre-referendum mental health, and was not present pre-referendum, 
suggests that the social identities themselves were key to the effect.  Fourthly, it would have been useful 
to have modelled a ‘traditional’ ethnic density effect (i.e. an area-level measurement of own-group ethnic 
density and its interaction with individual-level ethnicity) in the same model as the Brexit density effect, 
to be fully confident that the latter was not dependent on the former. Unfortunately this was not possible 
for reasons of multicollinearity as leave vote was negatively correlated with the ethnic diversity of 
constituencies – indeed the inclusion of individual-level ethnicity in Model 5 led to a moderate level of 
multicollinearity in this model. Fifthly, the proportion of the population claiming benefits was used as an 
area-level measure of poverty. This not as sophisticated as multidimensional measures of poverty such as 
the Welsh Indices of Multiple Deprivation (Welsh Government, 2014), or their English, Scottish, or 
Northern Irish equivalents. However these measures are presented as ranks, so are not comparable 
between nations, and are also not given at the constituency level, so were not appropriate for use here. 
However, it should be acknowledged that some residual confounding by economic deprivation is likely to 
be present in the estimates of interest. Finally, many studies of ethnic density effects focus on severe 
outcomes such as psychosis, whereas the present study examines much milder psychological distress. 
Clearly these outcomes should not be equated and no conclusions can be drawn on the relative 
magnitude of this Brexit density effect and ethnic density effects employing such outcome measures. 
  
To conclude, the present study demonstrates clear evidence of a group density effect on mental health 
following the UK’s referendum on EU membership, based on survey respondents’ views on EU 
membership and the result in their area of residence. This finding is not explained by plausible 
compositional confounds or by pre-referendum patterns in mental health. These results broaden 
evidence of group density effects from ethnic groups and social characteristics to political differences, 
which is especially notable due to the rapidity with which the political identities in question developed.. It 
also confirms the extent of political polarisation in the UK, in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum.  
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Figure A.  Post-referendum density effect by Government Office of the Regions area.
  Model A - Urban/rural Model B - Impact of 'no deal' Brexit on employment 
  Estimate 2.50% 97.50% Estimate 2.50% 97.50% 
Leave the EU (individual) 1.2450 1.0456 1.4826 1.1949 1.0135 1.4088 
Constituency leave vote (z-scored, SD=0.1127403) 1.0985 0.9818 1.2290 1.1281 1.0060 1.2650 
Income (z-scored, SD=1948.259) 0.8203 0.7358 0.9145 0.8197 0.7344 0.9149 
Age (z-scored, SD= 18.44425, linear term) 0.9226 0.8546 0.9960 0.9110 0.8423 0.9852 
Age (z-scored, Quadratic term) 0.9525 0.8911 1.0182 0.9550 0.8920 1.0224 
Male 0.6846 0.5968 0.7852 0.6864 0.5967 0.7895 
Area-level poverty (z-scored, SD=1.0399) 1.0838 0.9977 1.1772 1.0909 1.0039 1.1855 
Pre-referendum GHQ score >2 18.5184 14.4282 23.7680 19.0513 14.6451 24.7831 
Leave the EU * Constituency leave vote 0.8022 0.6765 0.9513 0.7727 0.6516 0.9164 
Rural area 0.9656 0.7546 1.2357       
Leave the EU * Rural area 0.8156 0.5706 1.1659       
Constituency leave vote * Rural area 0.9365 0.6911 1.2690       
Leave the EU * Constituency leave vote * Rural area 1.1844 0.7570 1.8533       
Consituency employment loss       0.9339 0.8386 1.0401 
Leave the EU * Consituency employment loss       1.1354 0.9683 1.3312 
Constituency leave vote * Consituency employment 
loss       1.0381 0.9262 1.1634 
Leave the EU * Constituency leave vote *Consituency employment loss     0.9894 0.8339 1.1739 
Supplementary table A. Results of models looking at geographical moderators of Brexit density effect. Model A looks at moderation by urban or 
rural residence of respondent. Model B looks at moderation by the Winters and Serwicka estimates of the impact of a ‘no deal’ Brexit on 
employment in each constituency. 
  
Term OR OR 2.5% OR 97.5% 
Leave the EU (individual) 1.079 0.936 1.243 
Constituency leave vote (z-scored, 
SD=0.1127403) 0.912 0.833 0.998 
Income (z-scored, SD=1948.259) 0.668 0.524 0.852 
Age (z-scored, SD= 18.44425, linear term) 0.726 0.677 0.778 
Age (z-scored, Quadratic term) 0.969 0.912 1.028 
Male 0.609 0.536 0.692 
Area-level poverty (z-scored, SD=1.0399) 1.062 0.988 1.142 
Leave the EU * Constituency leave vote 1.098 0.953 1.264 
Supplementary table B – The equivalent of Model 2 fitted to pre-referendum data 
 
  
Term B B 2.5% B 97.5% 
Leave the EU (individual) 0.135 0.024 0.246 
Constituency leave vote (z-scored, 
SD=0.1127403) 0.038 -0.037 0.114 
Income (z-scored, SD=1948.259) -0.118 -0.171 -0.065 
Age (z-scored, SD= 18.44425, linear term) -0.074 -0.129 -0.019 
Age (z-scored, Quadratic term) -0.066 -0.113 -0.018 
Male -0.257 -0.352 -0.162 
Area-level poverty (z-scored, SD=1.0399) 0.100 0.040 0.159 
Pre-referendum GHQ score >2 2.772 2.650 2.894 
Leave the EU * Constituency leave vote -0.125 -0.240 -0.010 
 Supplementary table C – A version of Model 3 with continuous GHQ data. 
 
 
 
